The ‘intense diplomacy’ to stop a US-China war: Peter Apps

It was the latest in a series of bilateral meetings between the two men that appear to have stemmed from the G20 Bali summit in November 2022, when U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping set them up as a quasi-formal back channel to put a “floor” on worsening relations.

As director of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee’s Foreign Affairs Commission, Wang is Xi’s top foreign policy adviser, also serving as foreign minister.

Last week, Sullivan chalked up what may in some respects be his most significant win so far – a direct meeting with Xi himself on a visit to the Chinese capital. That trip – as well as another marathon session with Wang – included a face-to-face meeting with General Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of China’s Central Military Commission , and his team.

Ever since military-to-military contact was terminated by Beijing following a May 2022 visit to Taiwan by U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi, U.S. officials have been anxious to restart it.

Over the last year, they have finally achieved some progress. Sullivan’s was the first U.S. meeting with a CMC vice-chair since 2018 – the CMC is chaired by Xi himself, and its two vice-chairs are China’s most senior military officers. As such, it will have been seen as particularly important.

Three years older than Xi, General Zhang is reported to have grown up with the Chinese leader after their fathers served together in the People’s Liberation Army.

Zhang is also one of China’s few remaining combat veterans from its brief 1979 war with Vietnam.

Seen as both loyal and trusted by the president, Zhang gives advice that may be among the most influential if Xi is considering whether Beijing should go to war again.

For the last three years, U.S. officials have said they believe the Chinese president has told his military to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027, but has not yet committed to so doing.

China views democratically governed Taiwan as its own territory and has ramped up

military and political pressure

to assert its claims, which Taipei strongly rejects, saying only the Taiwanese people can decide their future.

This year has also witnessed an escalating Chinese confrontation with the Philippines over disputed shoals in the South China Sea, one that continued to worsen last weekend after Sullivan’s departure.

Deterring an accidental conflict or deliberate Taiwan invasion, U.S. officials say, has been the top priority of the Biden administration since at least 2023. Whoever wins the White House in November’s election must then approach that challenge, but punchy bilateral diplomacy is likely to remain a feature.

Chinese media noted that almost everyone in the U.S. team visiting Beijing spoke fluent Mandarin, something Sullivan – who does not – said “makes my job a heck of a lot easier and makes me much better”. The meeting with Vice Chairman Zhang, Sullivan said, was particularly important.

“There is no substitute,” he said, “for being able to sit across the table, not just with the Vice Chairman but his whole team, and be able to hear…their perspective on critical issues, and them being able to hear from us…those same issues, whether it is cross- Strait relations or the South China Sea or cyber.”

Sullivan said he also pushed Chinese officials to cut back the transfer of Chinese industrial components to Russia, seen as increasingly vital in facilitating Russia’s ongoing invasion of Ukraine. Such requests, however, appeared largely ignored.

NO NEW XI-BIDEN MEETING YET

The 1970s meetings of one of Sullivan’s most influential predecessors, Henry Kissinger, with ageing Chinese leader Mao Zedong opened up a rapprochement in relations.

Now, Xi – whose China is hugely stronger, but facing growing demographic and economic problems – has implied that the U.S. should curb its Pacific presence and get out of China’s way onto both Taiwan and the South China Sea.

“First of all, we must answer the general question of whether China and the United States are rivals or partners,” Xi was quoted as telling Sullivan. Beijing’s intentions were “above board”, he said, and the U.S. should work to “find a correct way for two major countries to get along.”

According to accounts from Chinese officials present, Xi took an even more assertive approach with Biden at their direct meeting last November in California.

While the discussions were described as cordial, one official said Xi told Biden and other U.S. officials that reunification with Taiwan was “unstoppable”.

While others disputed that account, other comments from Xi – who turned 70 last year – suggest his patience on Taiwan is diminishing, while his anger at U.S. actions quietly grows.

Despite speculation Xi and Biden might see each other again, nothing beyond a telephone call between them was agreed last week – although U.S. officials noted both leaders were likely to be at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation gathering in Peru from Nov. 10 and the G20 in Brazil that follows.

Those gatherings will come after the U.S. presidential vote on Nov. 5, a reminder that Biden himself and potentially his top advisers – including Sullivan, a fixture in Democratic White House foreign policy since the 2009-16 Obama administration – may already find their influence waning.

Sullivan went out of his way to stress that any victory by the Democratic presidential contender, Vice President Kamala Harris, would bring relative continuity, including commitment to ongoing dialogue.

For now, the administration seems focused on small wins – above all, a deal with the CMC’s Zhang for direct communications between U.S. and Chinese regional commanders. The need for that has become pointedly more urgent, U.S. officials say.

On Saturday, a Chinese Coast Guard vessel rammed the Philippines patrol vessel BRP Teresa Magabanua in what appeared the latest effort to drive it away from Sabina Shoal, which a 2016 U.N. maritime court ruling placed within the Philippines Exclusive Economic Zone, but which also sits within a huge sea area claimed by China as part of its “historic waters”.

Given the 1951 U.S.-Philippines defence treaty, the head of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Admiral Samuel Paparo, said his units had a “range of options” to take action if ordered by the White House. Such statements – as well as visible movements of actual military forces – have been seen by the Pentagon as sometimes the best means to convey U.S. determination.

TOUGH MILITARY CONVERSATIONS

If Beijing follows through on last week’s promises, Paparo – a tough-talking aviator who frequently makes it clear his forces are prepared to take on China – may finally get a direct line or at least an introductory call with his Chinese counterpart.

On the Chinese side, that equivalent official was not named, but analysts suggest Eastern Theater Commander Lin Xiangyang is the most likely candidate. He is also potentially the Chinese operational commander for a Taiwan invasion.

While General Lin lacks Paparo’s public profile, his Eastern Theater Command has been increasingly active in recent years in strategic messaging.

During major Chinese naval manoeuvres off Taiwan in May following the inauguration of newly elected President Lai Ching-te, a spokesperson for the command was quoted describing them as a “strong punishment” for “separatist acts” of “Taiwan independence”. The command also released videos of mock-up missile strikes against the island.

If the Wang-Sullivan meetings are any guide, the discussions themselves may be somewhat formulaic.

Chinese officials often stick to talking points, stressing the importance of the “question” of Taiwan, then Beijing’s anger over U.S. arms sales and engagement with Taipei and refusal to accept wider Chinese maritime claims.

U.S. officials tend to push forward with proposals and conversations on a range of topics in the hope of finding common ground – but then also talking tough.

Speaking to the Financial Times last month, some U.S. officials said the Wang-Sullivan conversations would sometimes be allowed to turn to softer topics such as food, travel, music or sport, before returning to the real issues at hand, sometimes very firmly.

At a January meeting at the Pentagon with Major General Song Yanchao, deputy director of the Chinese CMC Office for International Cooperation, a U.S. press release said officials “reaffirmed that the United States will continue to fly, sail and operate safely and responsibly wherever international law allows.”

The good news, U.S. officials say, is that such discussions are resuming.

In December, the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs General CQ Brown spoke to China’s chief of the Joint Staff Department, General Liu Zhenli. At the end of May, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin met in Singapore with Chinese counterpart and former People’s Liberation Army Navy Chief Admiral Dong Jun for around 75 minutes, the first face-to-face meeting at that level since 2022.

“We believe … that intense diplomacy matters,” Sullivan told journalists in Beijing last week.

“It doesn’t resolve every issue, it doesn’t mean that we are going to agree on everything, but it does mean that we can improve understanding, we can clarify misperceptions, we can reduce the risk of miscalculation and we can identify areas to work together where our interests align that might previously have been hidden.”

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