Ukraine’s extraordinary incursion into Kursk has changed the narrative of the war – but is a high-risk strategy

The immediate impact of Ukraine’s incursion into the Russian region of Kursk that began on 6 August has been a transformation in the morale of the Ukrainian public and even more so the narrative among Ukraine’s international partners.

The slow but inexorable loss of ground in Donbas that painted a grim picture of retreat has been replaced by images of a dynamic front. While deceptive, this new narrative is important in reminding Ukraine’s international partners that outcomes in war are not inevitable.

Politically, the purpose of the operation is to build leverage ahead of possible negotiations. If Donald Trump wins the US presidency in November, the threat of withdrawing military-technical assistance is likely to force Kyiv to negotiate. The Ukrainian government wants to make sure that if it has to enter that process, it has things that Russia wants to trade for concessions. The Ukrainian military, therefore, must take and hold a sizeable chunk of Russian land for the duration of potential negotiations.

Another important element of the offensive is that Ukraine succeeded in maintaining operational security before launching the assault. This has been a significant problem with past Ukrainian operations, and the competence in the preparation and planning demonstrates lessons being learned from last year’s offensive that will encourage partners about the prospects for future operations.

It helped that Russian military intelligence appears to have suffered once again from a chronic lack of curiosity or imagination as Ukrainian forces were withdrawn from the line in Donbas.

So far Ukrainian forces in Kursk have been tactically successful. Undertrained Russian infantry have again performed poorly when lacking command and control, and confronted by a manoeuvring opponent without fixed points of reference. Surrendering Russian platoons are a symptom of the poor cohesion that exemplified the Russian collapse in Kharkiv in 2022.

While the Kursk operation is politically significant, a parallel series of Ukrainian strikes targeting Russian airfields is more militarily advantageous. Russian aircraft have been central to both the long-range strikes on Ukraine’s critical national infrastructure, and the glide bomb attacks on frontline positions that are inflicting heavy losses on Ukraine. Damaging planes is vital in reducing pressure on Ukraine’s defences.

There is a limit to how successful Ukraine can be. It was suffering from a shortage of troops to rotate and hold the line prior to its operation in Kursk. Now it has pulled together what was available as an operational reserve and committed it to a new axis. There is a limit to how far this force can push before it overextends, meaning it will need to dig in soon if the Ukrainians are to hold the ground until negotiations. But as soon as the front stops being dynamic, the Russians will dig defences and then bring up artillery, electronic warfare complexes and fresh troops. In the short term, the operation has diverted the weight of Russian air-delivered bombs away from Donbas, but this will be temporary. Russia has enough personnel and equipment to fight both fronts. It is less clear that this is true for Ukraine.

The military risks build with time. Having committed its operational reserve, Ukraine will struggle to plug gaps in the line, and it has not yet managed to resolve the threat posed by Russian reconnaissance drones, glide bombs, artillery, electronic warfare and operational-tactical missile complexes. Collectively these capabilities are allowing Russia to continue a steady advance to Pokrovsk, Toretsk and other towns in Donbas. These towns will soon be depopulated, and defending them will be resource-intensive.

The best-case scenario for Ukraine is that its units dig in and Russia – feeling compelled to retake the ground – suffers inordinate losses in trying to push the Ukrainians back. It is also possible, however, that the stretching of Ukrainian resources will increase opportunities for the Russians to find the seams in Ukraine’s defences and make advances elsewhere. If the latter dynamic unfolds, then it is not clear that the seized terrain will carry much weight in negotiations, as Vladimir Putin will be quite willing to absorb the losses to remove the issue from talks.

The other long-term challenge posed by Ukraine’s operation is the equipment that is being lost. Just as a Trump presidency will probably force Ukraine into negotiations, a Harris victory in November would see the likely continuation of military-technical assistance from the US. Even so, there are limited reserves of equipment. Ukraine could have been building units for larger-scale offensives next year, but this operation means critical vehicles and personnel – necessary for such an offensive – will probably be committed prematurely. The operation therefore limits future options.

For Ukraine’s international partners, the success of the Kursk operation rests on the rate of attrition that Ukraine can inflict and the volume of equipment loss it can impose on Russian units trying to counterattack.

For Ukraine itself, preserving its own personnel is vital, so the more it can degrade Russian forces with indirect fire, the better. The priorities for support include artillery ammunition, strike drones, and systems for knocking down Russian reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles that allow its forces to attack Ukrainian units while they are being resupplied.

Ukraine’s wider military position remains precarious, and the autumn looks to be politically challenging. Kyiv must strike a balance, preparing for the loss of critical supplies without burning its ability to fight on. For Europe, it is vital that Kyiv, if forced to negotiate, is given as strong a hand as possible, and that there is a concrete plan to ensure that any settlement produces a lasting peace.

While the immediate news from Kursk may have caused optimism, this should not distract Ukraine’s partners from helping to stabilise the broader front.

Dr Jack Watling is senior research fellow for Land Warfare at the Royal United Services Institute